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0--

EI4PLOYDIfNT OF A TELEGRAPH C0:1PANY AS DISTINGUISHEITE

FROMI

THAT OF A COMVAON CARRIER.

The business of telegraph cor,panies is

imilar to

that of the post office department in that they carry and
deliver messages for all persons indifferently for hire- they
resemble common carriers in that they assume to transmit messages for all perscns alike, without discrirination or preference, but differ from them in the liability they assume for
the safe and accurate delivery of messages.
Some of the authorities have attempted to classify the
business of telegraph eomanies under the head of bailment,
and to hold them to the same rules of lai applicable to common carriers.
But these seem very, ridiculous, for "there is here no
engageme-nt in
if

rem, no bailment v-orthy of the,nore

the sender leave a written nessage,

deliver,.d,

but remains mere

for even

this writing is

.-gstc paper,

not

or an office voucher,

after the ccmany has made an d dClivored its own correct
copy",

The reason of holding cormcn

as :vr.chculof puts it.

carrirtrs to such stringent liability as to make thea responsible as insurorswas tc protect the public intcx-est against
thefts and other mis-prision of the carriers, and their servants.

But this reason entirely fails to apply in case of

tclegraph companies as there is nothing to steal in strict
sense.

Besides the operation of telegraphing is continually

subject to dangers from accident, malice, and atm....nric
influence of which the company has no control.
Johnson J., in delivering the opinion of the court in
the case of 3reesc v.

United States Tel.

Co.,

says:

"

I can

not refrain from observing here, that the business on which
the defendant is el-d,,of transmitting ideas only from one
point to another, by means of electricity operating upon an
extended and insulated wire, and giving them expression at the
remote ;Ioint of delivery by certain mechanical sunds, or by
marks or signs indented, which represent words or single letters of the alphabet, is so radically and ,ssentially different, not only in its nature and character, but in all its
I

methods and (a!encies from the business of transporting merchandise and material substance from ?1ace to place by cominon
carriers,

that the

;eculiar and stringent rules by which the

latter are controlled and regulated, can h.ave very little
just and proper application to the former.

And all attempts

heretofore made by courts to subject the tw o kinds of business
to the same legal rules and liabilities,
sooner or later, have to be abomonerd

will, in my jud.Zment
as clnusy and undiscrim-

inating efforts and contrivances to assimilate things which
have no natural relation or affinity whatever, and at best,
but loose and mere fanciful resemblance.

5ht bearer of

written cr printed dociumients and messages from one to another
if such was his business or employment, might very properly
be called and held a common carrier

while it

would obviously

be little short of an absurdity to give that designation or
character to the bearer of mere verbal messages delivered to
him by mere signs of speebM to be communicated in like manner.
The former would hate something which is,

or might be the

subject of property, capable of being lost, stolen, and
wrongfully appropriated; while the latter would have nothing

-z-

in the nature of property which could be converted or destroyed, or form the subject of larceny or of tgrtious caption and
appropriation even by the king:s enemies."
It is then safe to say that all docisions agree that a
telegraph company is liable only by the reason of negligence,
willful Cefault, or bad faith in the performance of the duty
which it undertakes, but not as an insurer.

CHAPTER II.

DEGREE OF CARE IECESSARY IN TPAIlSSION OF

ESSAGES.

The degree of care which telegraph companies are
bound to exercise in the performance of their duties is variously stated by different courts, but no doubt they all mean
that telegrap; companies should use a decree of care proportionate to tte hazards in their business.
"The degree of care., says Foster,J. in Fowler v. W.U.
Tel. Co.,

"which these companies are bound to usc, is to be

measured with reference to the kind of business in uhich they
are engaged.

As compared with many other kinds of business,

the care required of them might be called

'great carol.

Vhile meaning really the sname, it is variously stated by different courts in the decisions to which we have referred:
'due and reasonable care';

'ordinary care and vigilance';

'reasonable and proper care';
and diligence';

'a reasonable degree of care

'care and diligence adequate to the business

which they undertake';

'with skill, with care, and with

attention; a high degree of responsibility'.

These are but

the varied forms of expressing the requirement of what is
known in law as ordinary care, as applied to an employment of
thts nature, an employment which is not that of an ordinary
bailee.

The public as a general rule have no choice in the

selection of the company.

They have none in the selection

of its servants or agents.

They have no control over the

agencies or instrumentalities used in conducting the business
of the company.

The public must tke the aucncies which the

company furnishes, and they have no supervision over its management or methods of performing the service which it holds
itself out as willing and read

to perform.

And while we do

not hold that these companies are conmon carriers, and subject to the sane sovere rule of responsibility, we thinX that
those who engage in the business of thus serving the public
by transmitting messages whould be held to a high degree of
diligcnce, skill and care, and should be responsible for any
negligence or unfaithfulness in the performance of their
duties."

This is supported by Birnoy v.

Tel. Co., 18 Md., 341.

Uev

York & Wash.

-GHore the court hold a telegraph company to a high degree
of care,

diligence and skill,.

But this does not nean to im-

pose a liability upon the company for want of knowledge or
skill, which are not reasonably attainable in the art, hor
for errors, or imperfections arising from causes which are
beyond its Dower to control.

Thus what may be called a

'reasonable degree cf care' in the business of telegraphy,
which requires a most delicate operation, vwould amount to a
'high degree of care' in other business.

-7CHAPTER III.
_ O_

STIPULATIONS AND REGULATIONS LIMITING THEIR LIABILITY.

As the operation of telegraphy is subject to electrical and atmospheric disturbances, and other kindred causes
courts and legislatures have been very liberal and allow telegraph companies to stipulate and regulate their liability in
many instances.
In the case of U.S.Tcl.Co. v. Gilderslevc, the judge
says" in the view of the court, it would be manifestly unreasonable to hold these telegraph ccmpanies liable for every
mistake of accidental delay that may occur in the opwration
of their lines.

From the very nature of the service, while

due diligence and good faith may be required at the hands of
the company and its

agents,

accidents and delays,

and mis-

carriages may occur, that the greatest amount of care can not
avoid.

Hence in

England,

and in many Anerican States, pro-

vision has -een made by Statutes authorizing these companies
to prescribe rules and regulations whereby they may be pro-

-8-

tected against extraordinary liability."
But these stipulationz and regulations in order to be
valid, must be reasonable.

They cannnt establish any regu-

lations which will relieve the companies from liability for
the gross negligence, willful misconduct, fraud or bad faith
of themselves or those of their servants.
A comprohensive statement of this doctrine is stated by
KentJ. as follows:1.

Such companies offering to perform services for

the public, at fixed rates, exercise a quasi-public cmployment
2.

Telegraph company may enforce and adopt reasonable

rules and regulations, for the convenience, prompt and satisfactory performance of the act or dtty undertaken.
3.

This right in

a company is

not absolute or unlimited

but such rules are subject to the test of reasonableness,

in

view of the rightful claims of public policy and private
rights,

and the enforcement

of the obligation of

ood faith

and honest effort to perform.
4.

The test must be applied by the court, whenever the

question arises on the validity of any such regulation accord-

-9ing to the rule already stated.
51
linquency,

A rule or stipulation which covers all possible domistakes,

delays,

or neglect in

transmitting or

delivering, or not delivering a nossage, fr~m whatever cause
arising is not a reasonable regulation w,ithin these rules.
6.

Such rule is not saved from these objections by the

condition of liability to repay, if required by the sender
the trifle paid to them.
liability,

and is

It is a more evasion of the legal

never the measure of dcomages for non-perf or-

mance of a contract of this kind.
Regarding the transmio.ion of telegraph messages, the
authorities generally agree that such regulations, as requiring messages tC be repeated on half the usual charge to
guard against mistakes, is reasonable, and a telegraph company is not liable in the absence of bad faith and gross negligence.
Massach.usetts, and in recent cases, New York go so far
as to exonerate the com-pany froma the liability beyond anount
paid for transmission even where damages wore caused by delay
or non-delivery of messages where the condition in the blank

-loon which message is written contains a provision that the
cor.pany should not be liable for mistakes delays or the nondelivery of any unrepeated message, beyond the ariount received
for sending the same.
But there are cases which hold that vhere the repeating
of the message would not have prevented the daraages complained
of, the company is liable; that such a stipulation will not
be allowed to operate so as to exonerate a negligent delay in
delivering, or non-delivery.

This seems to proceed on a

principle more reasonable and just, as the object of repeating th- message is to correct errors, and not to avoid delays
in delivering it.
This view is expressed _y Justice Breese of the Supreme
Court of Illinois in the following words:-

"

If it be a con-

tract, the sender entering into it wzas under a species of
moral dress.

His necessities compelled him to resort to

the telegraph as the only means through which It could speedily transact the business in hand, and was ccmT-ellcd to submit to such conditions as the company in their corporate
greed might impose, and sign such a paper as the company

-11might present.
the company is

'Prudential rules and regulations' such as
authorized by statute to establish,

cannot be

understood to embrace such regulations as chall "e-orivc a
party of the use of their instrumentality, save by coming under most onerous and unjust conditions.

But it is said, a

special agreement might have boon made for insuranco
writing.

in

To do this, the anount of risk must be specified

on the contract, and paid at the time of sending the message;
and so there is

btt

one person in

the world,

a superintendant,

authorized to make a contract of insurance, he must be humted
up and the terms negotiated-- all which requires time-- and a
favorable opportunity to the sender be irretrievably lost.
At Chicago, or other large cities, where a superintendant is
supposed to be, thcite might not be much loss, but we are declaring the law for the whole State,

and it

is

well knoirn

that at subordinate , though important stations, on telegraph
lines, superintendents are nt to be found, the provision is
to such perfectly valueless.

As a party, repeating a message

ahd paying fifty per-cent additional therefore, cannot recover
of the company to the extent bf his loss, we are free to say

-12such a c ntract, forced, as we have shown it is, upon the
sender, is in our opinion, unjust, unscionable, writhout consideration and utterly void."
The very undertaking cf a telegraph company whenever it
receives a message for transmission, necessarily implies an
engagement on its part to exercise care and diligence in
transmitting as well as in delivering it, and negatively
not to be guilty of negligence in doing so.

Therefore it

is absurd , unjust, and against the public policy to allow
it to engage to exercise diligence in thd undertaking , and
to accept pay for it, the sender of the nessr e thus executing the contract on his part, and then to allow it to stipulate that it shall not be liable if it do not exercise diligence.

-17_
CHAPTER IV.
_ O_

FAILURES AND

'ELAYS IN DELIVERING 2IMSSAGES

The telegraph company must make reasonable effort
to find the person to whom the message is addressed , and to
deliver the same within a reasonable time, and ii failing to
do so render itself liable for such damages as is the direct
and necessary result of such failure.
As regards to the transmission of messages it is generally provided by the statutes 6f "ifforent states, that messages shall be forwarded in the order of time, with reference
to other messages ,
graph company.

in

wvhich they were delivered to the tele-

Doubtless this would be a proper requirement

even in the absence of statutory provisions, as any preference is against public policy -lthough there may be cases
where the company is justified in forwarding urgcent messages
ahead of their turn; and this is also true in case of delivery
At any rate a prompt delivery is the essence of the contract and a failure in that reDpect will authorize the recov-

-14cry of at least the compen-sation paid.
What is an unreasonable delay in a delivery of a message
to entitle plaintiff to reccver dpnages depends upon the circunstazices of each case; an.d the question is one for the
jury to determine

, except where it

admits no doubt as to its

unreasonableness, when it is for the court to determine.
The broad general rule as laid down in Hadley v, Boxendale as explained by the case of Griffin v. Clover, "that the
injured by a breach of contract is entitled to recover all
his damage including

gains p-revented as well as losses sus-

tained provided they are certain and such az might naturally
be expected to follow the breach

",

is applicable to the case

of telegraph companies.
In Leonard v. T.Y.&c.Tel. Co., Judge Earl, says:-

11The

cardinal rule, undoubtedly is that the one party shall recover
all the damages which have been occassioned by the breach of
contract by the other party.
its application by two others,.

But the rule is modified in
The d,-nages must flow direct-

ly and naturally from the breach of contract , and they must
be certain , both in their nature and in res-ect to the cause

-15from which they proceed.

Under this latter rule, speculative

contingent, and remote damages, which cannot be directly
traced to the breach complained of, are excluded.
Under the former rule,

such 'amagcs

are cnly allowed as

may fairly supposed to have entered into the contemplation
of parties when they made the contract, as night naturally
be expected to follow its violation.

It is not required that

the -arties must have contemplated the actual damages which
are to brn allowed.
ties

may fairly

But the damages rust be such as the par-

be supoosc.! to have contemplated vhen they

made the contract.
Parties entering into contracts usually contemplate that
they will be performed, and not they will be violated.

They

very rarely actually contemplate an# damages which would flow
from any breach, and very frequently have not sufficient information to know what such damages would be.
ties

As both par-

are usuially equally bound to know and be informed of the

facts pertaining to the execution or breach of a ,ontract
which they Lave entered into, I ':hink a more precise statement of this rule is, that a party is liable for all the

-1()direct damages

,,hich both parties to the contract would have

contemplated as flo.inentered into it,

froM its broach, if, at the time they

they had bestow.d proper attentio: upon the

subject, and had been fully informed of the facts."1
It can be said without any hesitation that tlu
just state

rule

is recognized by a large ma-rity both in Jngland

and the United States if not universally.
A well known statement that where an accident happens,
which in the ordinary course of things and according to common experience,

would not happen if

reazonable

or ordinary

care were exercised to prevent it by the person whose duty it
is to prevent it, the happening of the accident is 6f itself
evidence of negligence,

sufficient , in a

resulting damages against the person

action for the

7uilty of the default,

to warrant a jury in giving a verdict for the plaintiff is
also governed by the rule above stated.
Therefore, unless, plaintiff at the time of delivering a
message to the company for transmission, conraunicates its importance or urgency specially or that this is shown ol

its

face, cannot recover for loss arising fron special circum-

-17stanck s not so communicated.
Thus where a tcl('raph compa--y neglected to deliver a
mcssaze to a live-stock shipper as to the state of the markcl
at a certain point, in consequence of which neglect the shipper sends his stock to the next

mar>, t,

,rest

at vrhic

he

receives ton cents 9(Dr one-hundred less than the market price
for the same stock ranged at the first point on the same day,
it was held:- that the shipper is entitled to recover from
the telegraph company the difference between the market price
of the two points, with the difference in freight added.
And also where one has sold cattle for future delivery
at the option of the purchaser, and thv

latter sends a dis-

patch notifying him that he will take the cattle in the morning of the next day, in pursuance of a custom among stock
dealers to take and weigh cattle at early day-light, which
dispatch the telegraph company fails

to deliver promptly,

whereby the weighing of the cattle is delayed and their
weight decreased, it is said that the seller may recover for
the loss of weight so resulting from the company's negligence.
Again in a case where one delivered a message for trans

-18mission to a telegraph company directed to his attorney at a
certain city as follows:-

"Hold my case till Tuesday or

Thursday. Please reply."1

The plaintiff at the time informed

the servant of the company , having charge of the receipt of
messages that the message related to a cause in the .aid city,
which was expected to be called,

and that it

was of great

importance that he should get a reply the dext day,
that he might know when to go to the said place.
never was sent at all.

in

order

The message

The plaintiff having received no

reply supposing that an adjournment of the case could not be
procured, wont to the said place with his counsel to attend
the trial, and found that the case had been adjourned.

Con-

sequently the plaintiff was obliged to go there again with
his counsel at the adjourned day.

It

was held that the com-

pany was liable to the expense of the first journey for both
the plaintiff and his counsel,, and also for the counsel fee
which the p.laintiff was obliged to pay for going there the
next time.
The above cases are a few of the instances where it was
held, according to the rule already ljid

dovn, that damages

-10are proximate and were within the ccntcmjilaton of the partics
On the other hand following cases are instances where
the courts held that damages are too remote and contingent
and therefore not within the contemplation of the parties+
Where in consequence of the delay of a telegraph company
in

delivering a dispatch a barge did not reach

a lot of

staves in time to prevent their being lost, by a flood; where
owing to the failure to deliver a message ordering a saw, a
mill did lie idle, but the message did not show for whom the
article ,7as intended, and the company did not know that the
mill was lying idle on that account.

So whero the loss of a

note which plaintiff claims his father would have given him,
had le been able to see him before his death, was hold a consequence too remote and contingent to sustain a claim for
damages.

And also where there was delay in delivering a

telegram announcing the death of a person, without giving the
company notice of his relationship to the person addressed,
in conseqence of which the :person, a brother of the deceased
failed to attend the funeral, it was hold that the company is
not responsible as it
parties.

w-s not within the contemplation of the

-20CHAPTER V.
_ o_
INJUI Y TO 7M] F]ZELING.

Ever since the soRelle case held a telegraph company is liable for mental anguish caused by delay or nondelivery of messages if such damagec are proximate consequence
of the company's negligence, the urgency or importance of
the message being explained, or understood by the company,
the courts of Texas have followed it, although once overruled by the case of Gulf &c.R.Co. v. Levy,.

And it seems

that the question is new well settled in that State, for the
Judge in delivering the opinion of' the court in Potts v. W.U.
Tel. Co.,
says:-

which is

late

case in that State,

"It is no longer open question that a recovery can be

had for mental suffering caused by negligent failure of a
telegraph company to delivor a message.
This has also sometimes been followed by courts of Kentucky, North Carolina, Dakota, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama
and other States.

-21The view taken by those courts may be illustrated by
quoting one or two opinions.
The Court of ~meals

of IKentucky in tolding a telegraph

company liable for mental anguish says:-

, Many of the text-

writers say that a person cannot recover duma-es for mental
anguish alone

and that he can recover sch

damages only

where he is entitled to recover some damages upon some other
ground.

it will generally

LO

found however, that they are

speaking of cases of po:sonal injury.

If

a telegraph com-

pany undertakes to send a message, and fa.ils to use ordinary
diligence in doing so, it is certainly liable for some damage.
It has violated

its contract;

and whenever a party does so

he is liable at least to some extent.

Every infraction of a

legal right causes injury, in contemplation of law.

The

party being entitled in such a case to recover something,why
should not an injury to the feelings which 17 often more injurious than a physical one,

enter into the estimate ?

being entitled to some damages by reason of the other
wrongful act,

Why,
party's

should not the complaining party recover all

the damages arising from it?

It seems to us that no sound

-22The business of tele-

reason can be given to the contrary.
-raphing,

while yet in

its

infancy,

is

extent and importance to the public,.
the end cann.ct yet be soen.

d-ready of wonderful
It is growing, and

A telegraph company is a quasi

public agent, and as such it should

exercise the extraordi-

nary privileges accorded to it, with diligence to the public.
If in"

ttersof mere trade, it negligently fails tc do its

duty, it is responsible for all the natural and proximate
damage.
Is it to be said or held, that as to .atters of
greater interest of a person, it shall not be, because feelings or affections only are involved?
If it negligently fails to deliver a message which closes
a trade for $100, or even less, it is responsible for the
damage.
it is said, however, that if it is guilty of like
fault as to a messag-e to the husband that the wife is dying,
or the father that his son is dead, and will be buried at
a certain time, there is no responsibility save that which is
normal.
It

Such a rule at first blush, merits disapproval.

would sanction the company in

wrong-doing.

it would

hold it responsible in matters of the least impcrtance, and

suffer it to violate its contracts with impunity as to the
greater.

It

seems to us that both reason and *public policy

require that it

should answer for all injury resulting from

its

whother it

negligence,

be to the feelings or the purse,

subject only to the rule that it must be the direct and proximate consequence of the act.

The injury to the feelings

should be regarded as a part of the actual damages,
jury be allowed to consider it.

and the

17 it be said that it does

not pormit of accurate pecuniary measurement, equally so may
it be said of any case where min tal anguish enters the estimate of injury for a wrong, and it ftrhishes no sufficient
reason why an injured party should not be allowed to look
to the wrong-doer for reparation.
If injury to the feelings be an element to the actual
damage in slander, libel, and breach of promise cases, it
seems to us it should equally be so considexed in cases of
this character.

If not, th on most grievous wrongs may often

be inflicted with impunity; legal insult, added to outrage
by the party , by offering one cent, or the cost of the telegram, as compensation to the injured -,arty.

7lhether. the

injury be to the feelings, or pecuniary, ti'e act of th4e violation of a right secured by contract has crused it .
The source is the same, and the violat:r should answer
for all the proximate damages.

1"

These courts reason that it is against the public policy not to hold the telegraph company liable for damages to
mental sufferings

,

and claim thaft mental anguish constitutes

an element of actual damanes, and a verdict for damages is
justifiable when nothing appears to show that the jury acted
under passion or prejudice.

But, some of the rea nt cases

disagree on the ground of difficulty in ascertaining the damages of thes nature, audit is not within the province of
courts in the absence of otatutes so to do, though they agree
as to the reasoning of public -)olicy.
Thus in
says:that is

Graham v.

W.U.Tel.

Co.,

District Judge Williamsi

'Counsel has ;ead from the Carolina report and I think
the strongest the case can be put;

and that

is

very

much in consonance with the sentiment which must arise, to a
large extent, in the breast of all men;

but, when you come

to analyze it, I think the best you can say is that this

-25sentiment h(s carried

y the bottor judgment of tlu

court.

There is nothing to maintain it, and it is not as a principW
of law sound in

The term " ctual damages"

any respect .......

has a significance and meaning of itg o=r

, cnd any attempt

tp reason a claim of this kind into actual damages certainly
must fail etc.'.
In the case of the International Ocean Tel. Co. v.
Saunders, TaylorJ. in maintaining that damages cannot be recovered for mental anguish unless coupled with or accompanied
by substantive injury to tie
the case under considerationr

persom , or estate, says:tW

"In

plaintiff's suit, though

sounding in tort, is for compensation only for the breach by
the defendant telegraph cow:pany of its

contract promptly to

deliver a telegram surmmoning him to the death-bed of his wife.
His only injury resulting directly from such breach of contract was mental suffering and disappointment in not being

able to attend upon his wife in her last moments, and to
be present at her funeral.

The resultant injury is one that

sorrs, so exclusively within the realng of spirit land that is
beyond the reach of the courts to deal with, or to compunzate

-26by any of the known standards of value.

It presents a class

of cases wZere legislative action fixing some standard of
recovery would be highly appropriute

but, vr

until the

action is taken, we do not feel that the cc urts are authorized
to so widely diver (, from the circumscribed limits of judicial action as to undertake to mete out compensation in money
for the spiritual intangible."
Again Justice Cooper in the case of Telegraph Co. v.
Rogers,

upoholding the long established rule of law upon this

subject, says:- " Wo are not disposed to depart from what we
consider the old and settled principle of law, nor to follow

the few courts in which the new rule has been announced.

The

difficulty of applying any measure of damages for bodily injury is universally recognized and commented on by the courts.
But in that

class of cases demands for simulated and imagin-

ary injuries are far less likely to be made than will be
those in suits for mental 1ai_

alone.

No one but the plain-

tiff can know whether he really suffers any rental disturbance, and its extent and severity must depend upon his own
mental peculiaity.

In the nature of things, money cah neither

-27-

pallil te nor compensate the injury he has sustained.

Mental

pain and anxiety the law cannot Value, and does not pretend
to redress, when the unlawful act ccmlained of causes that
alone."
Another difficulty in determining measure of damages in
cases of mental anguish, is, us pointed out in Judge Lurton's
dissenting opinion in Wadworth v. T61. Co., that the grief
natural to the death of a loved relative itself ought to be
separated from the added grief afnd anguish resultini

from

delayed information of such mortal illness or death.
In New York, the tendancy is to follow the latter view
asC:was clcided in the case of Lchman v. Brookly City R.R.Co.,
where a woman was standing in the door of her husband's house
(ir) a state of pregnancy) took fright in account of a ru-away
horse of the defendant company, and suffered mental anguish.
ThoWgh in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.,

where a woman

was about to step aboard of a street car, another car of the
defendant came from the other direction in such an enormous
speed that the driver could not check or stop it until it
nearly run over the plaintiff,

consequently she became ill,

producing a

an5. mental
oiscarriage,
axguish

the defendant company was li:'bi,,

,

it

was held

this was a case where the

mental anguish was accompa.-ied by physical injury.
Fron the above discussions, it nay fairly be concluded
that the authoritios generally agree as to the proposition
that the da.ages may be given as exemplary fosria.ges where
there is 1ilice, fraud, oppression, or negligence so gross
as to evince a disregard of social duty and, therefore,
tantamount to malice;

but they disagree as to whether in the

absence of some substantial injury accompanying the mental
sufferings , the demaes can be given as compensatory damages
or not.

And I may say tha

the view taken in opposition to

the Texas decisions, goes a step further,and is sounder one,
from the s~andpoint of law.

Though the law opposes to the

multiplication of litigation, which result is d-ready shown
in Texas, since the new rule has been announced, yet from the
standpoint of public policy and justice,

the telegraph com-

panies ought to be held to the highest degree of care in such
a case; and I do not doubt that the day will not be far distant when some appropriate measu.'e will be ± aken by the legi slatures.

